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Abstract. This paper investigates the extent to which world market price changes are 
transmitted through changes in border prices into local producer prices for four 
agricultural product markets in Tanzania: sugar, cotton, wheat and rice. The changes in 
the marketing channels for each of these products resulting from market liberalization are 
described. The statistical analysis finds that, in general, Tanzanian border and world 
market prices for these products do not move closely together, although there is evidence 
that border prices are influenced by world market price levels but not vice versa. The 
absence of monthly price data at producer level for these products did not permit a 
detailed examination of the relationship between farmgate prices and either border prices 
or world market prices. However, the qualitative discussion suggests that the extent of 
price transmission is likely to be imperfect. These results have implications for the 
interpretation of simulation results modelling the potential impact of trade policy changes 
on Tanzanian producers and consumers. They also underline the need for concerted 
efforts by policy makers to reduce the extent of monopoly power in these marketing 
chains and to improve the degree of price transmission.  
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  2Introduction 
 
Most industrialized countries have supported agriculture using domestic subsidies (e.g. 
producer subsidies), export subsidies, and restrictions on market access. Attempts are 
now being made to discipline these trade policies through round-table negotiations in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round. Their objective is the 
reduction and removal of the distortionary price and trade policies of WTO member 
countries by moving domestic prices closer to international prices. The thrust behind 
these changes is that free trade would allow countries to compete fairly in the world 
market. The anticipated impact of the trade reforms on Least Developing Countries 
(LDCs) is greater access to rich country markets.  
 
While trade reforms may offer greater opportunity for developing countries to participate 
in international trade, there are several barriers that might cause local markets to be less 
responsive to economic signals arising from external markets. Winters, McCulloch and 
McKay (2004), for example, have indicated that transfer costs are generally higher in 
LDCs than in developed countries, and often attenuate border shocks as they pass through 
to households for importable goods and exacerbate the shocks for exportable goods. 
Moreover, economic signals can even get lost completely if markets are monopolized; a 
typical characteristic of markets in developing countries dominated by marketing boards 
or the private monopolies that often emerge when the markets are liberalized.  
 
The extent of price transmission from world to domestic prices is a critical parameter in 
empirical trade models which attempt to assess the impact on prices, output, consumption 
and welfare in one country of trade policy reform in another country. For example, a 
study by Giblin and Matthews (2005) attempted to capture the impact of European Union 
(EU) unilateral trade liberalization on Tanzania, Uganda and other Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries, on one hand, and on the EU, on the other hand. The study found that 
Sub-Saharan African producers would benefit from the higher world market prices 
resulting from EU reform, while consumers would be made worse off. This conclusion is 
based on the assumption that there is a flexible pass-through of price signals across the 
markets. However, the realism of this assumption remains to be verified. 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the degree to which world market shocks are transmitted to 
domestic markets is limited (Baffes and Gardner, 2003 review some of the evidence). 
Hazell et al. (1990) argue that world price shocks have been transmitted to LDCs in the 
dollar value of export unit values; however, the effect has not been fully transmitted to 
producers either due to exchange rate misalignment or other domestic distortions. Quiroz 
and Soto (1993) also found that transmission of international price shocks in agriculture 
was either negligible or completely non-existent. On the other hand, Morriset (1998) 
examined the difference between world and domestic prices in industrialized countries 
and found upward movements in world price were passed through to domestic markets 
and not vice-versa. Understanding the extent to which prices are transmitted across 
borders and regions of a country is imperative to assess how producers and consumers in 
local markets are likely to respond to price changes in external markets.  
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and Temu (2004) have assessed price integration between pairs of segmented regions 
within the country. To the author’s best knowledge, no study so far has examined the 
integration between world and local market prices in Tanzania. The findings of these 
earlier studies provide useful insights into the degree of price integration in local markets 
and highlight policy intervention measures needed to improve market efficiency. 
However, knowledge of the degree of price transmission between world and domestic 
markets is generally lacking. This study attempts to examine price linkages between 
world and domestic prices for a number of commodity markets in Tanzania. Four markets 
are selected for analysis: sugar, cotton, wheat and rice.  
 
This paper is organised into four sections including this introduction. Section 2 reviews 
different approaches used to model price transmission. Section 3 gives a brief analysis of 
the four commodity markets in Tanzania, discusses the data used and presents the 
empirical results. A summary of findings and concluding remarks are presented in 
Section 4. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Techniques to test for the degree of spatial integration between spatially separated 
markets have evolved over time. Many of the early studies applied to agricultural markets 
in LDCs appealed to the simple idea that prices in spatially separated markets should be 
highly correlated (Ejiga, 1977; Jasdawalla, Jones, 1972, 1966: Lele, 1967, and Loveridge, 
1991). The use of correlation coefficients to test for market integration has many flaws 
because common components like population growth, climatic patterns, and inflation 
might induce systemic effects across markets. Other synchronous common factors such 
as monopoly procurement of agricultural products at identical prices from different 
markets might also induce systemic effects in price series (Harris, 1979, Heytens, 1986). 
Another limitation related to the use of correlation coefficients to test for spatial price 
linkage is the potential for independent price variation within the margin or band created 
by transaction costs (Lele, 1971). 
 
Regression-based procedures have also been used to test for spatial price integration 
(Monke and Petzel, 1984; Isard, 1977; Mundlak and Larson, 1992; Gardner and Brooks, 
1994). However, the use of regression-based tests has several shortcomings. The models 
are intrinsically static in nature because adjustment lags are not explicitly recognized and 
contemporaneous arbitrage conditions are assumed to hold. Also, nonstationarity of price 
data may invalidate standard econometric tests thus giving misleading results regarding 
the degree to which price signals are being transmitted from one to another market. The 
limitations related to the neglect of transaction costs and price variation within the 
transaction cost band also apply to regression tests.  
 
Time-series analysis techniques are widely used to test for the dynamic nature of 
interregional commodity trade and arbitrage activities. These tests typically use one or 
more techniques such as Granger causality, dynamic regression tests, impulse response 
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integration analysis. A brief summary of these tests follows. 
 
Granger causality (GC) tests are typically conducted within the VAR framework 
following Granger (1969). The approach is used to test for spatial price integration in 
terms of lead and lag relationships among dynamically interrelated prices. Alexander and 
Wyeth (1994); Koontz, Garcia and Hudson (1990); Mendoza and Rosegrant (1995); and 
Uri, Chomo, Hoskin, and Hyberg (1993) are some of the empirical applications of GC 
tests. Granger causality tests may provide some inferences about the existence of 
statistically significant lead/lag linkages among prices. However, GC tests, taken alone, 
indicate only whether the relationship between contemporaneous and lagged prices is 
statistically different from zero. Inferences from GC tests do not reveal the nature of the 
relationship. Thus, it is necessary to supplement Granger causality test results with other 
inferential procedures. Other limitations associated with correlation coefficients and 
standard regression approaches to testing for market integration also apply to GC tests. 
 
Dynamic regression models, notably pioneered by Ravallion (1986), are alternative, 
dynamic versions of standard regression models and GC tests. Timmer (1987) extended 
the usefulness of Ravallion’s approach through construction of an index of market 
connection (IMC) that gives an easily understandable measure of short-run market 
integration between two markets. Several studies have used the IMC to test for market 
connectedness (Ashimogo, 1995; Teklu, von Broun, and Zaki, 1991; Nyange, 1999; and 
Webb, von Braun, and Yohannos, 1992). Nonetheless, the interpretation of the IMC is 
still ambiguous; a larger value, for example, might indicate that markets are not 
integrated or that markets are integrated but transport costs exhibit a higher degree of 
persistence. Similarly, a low IMC suggests that markets are not isolated but it is unclear 
how connected the markets are. Therefore, prior knowledge about market structure and 
institutions is crucial to support the interpretation of the IMC (Alexander and Wyeth, 
1994). 
 
Impulse response VAR models measure the spread of a price shock and provide 
additional information regarding the dynamic time-path of price adjustments, which 
allows examination of the extent of price adjustment over time (Goodwin, Grennes, and 
MucCurdy, 1999). However, analysts have interpreted impulse response functions (IRFs) 
differently. While some have indicated that IRFs represent dynamic disequilibrium 
adjustments, others have argued that IRFs reflect equilibrium adjustments to economic 
shocks. Overall, analysts have suggested to interpret IRFs with great care because IRFs 
are normally specified to ensure that prices form a causally recursive system (Cooley and 
LeRoy, 1985; Leamer, 1985). 
 
Co-integration tests are tests of long-run tendencies. The use of these tests has been 
justified on the assertion that arbitrage behaviour prevents prices in spatial markets from 
drifting too far apart. The assumption inherent in this assertion is that transport costs are 
stationary. Ignoring transaction costs that might prevent spatial arbitrage thereby 
inhibiting price transmission, and failure to account for discontinuous or bidirectional 
  5trade, are the major limitations of co-integration analysis (Barrett, 1996; Baulch, 1997; 
Goodwin and Piggott, 2001). 
 
The limitations of the modeling approaches discussed above have contributed to the 
development and application of more sophisticated approaches to measure market 
integration such as the threshold autoregressive model (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; 
Goodwin and Piggott, 2001) and Baulch’s (1997) parity bound model. However, these 
sophisticated techniques are inherently difficult to model and require specific computer 
skills or software. 
 
In summary, measuring the degree of price transmission lacks a single explicit empirical 
test because of market dynamic relationships that arise due to inertia or discontinuity in 
trade as well as non linearities that arise due to distortions in arbitrage. In this study, co-
integration and causality techniques have been used to test for price transmission. The 
testing procedure follows that suggested by Rapsomanikis et al (2003) and is outlined in 
Appendix 1.  
 
Prior to testing for co-integration price series were tested for stationarity using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981). The ADF test was 
conducted for each series at the level and first difference. To test for co-integration a unit 
root test was applied to the static regression as shown below (Goodwin and Schroeder, 
1991). 
 
µ β α t t t P P = − −
2 1         ( 1 )  
 
In equation (1) above   and  are logarithmic commodity prices and  Pt
1 Pt
2 µtare deviations 
from price parity. 
 
An autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model for the Granger-causality test was 
developed following the Engle and Granger (1987) specification provided below: 
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where T  is the time trend, εt  is the error term, and other terms are as defined in 
equation (1). 
 
Lags for the ADL model were selected to minimize the Akaike’s Information Criterion. 
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3.  Institutional and Statistical Analysis of Commodity Markets 
 
3.1  The Sugar Industry in Tanzania 
 
Sugarcane is an important commercial crop in Tanzania and is the main source of sugar 
produced for export and domestic consumption. Most sugarcane is grown in estates 
owned by the sugar processing factories as well as contract growers. There are four sugar 
estates in the country namely Kilombero and Mtibwa estates in Morogoro region, 
Tanganyika Planting Company in Kilimanjaro, and Kagera sugarcane estates in Kagera 
region. In general, total sugar production is often below the country’s annual demand for 
the commodity (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, 2005). Statistics also indicate 
that Tanzania is a net importer of refined sugar (Figure 1). According to the TRA export 
records for 1998-2004, Tanzania imported sugar from a range of countries but four 
countries (South Africa, India, Netherlands, Zambia) accounted for 88% of the total 
(Table 1). During the same period, sugar exports went largely to Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) (84.0%) and Kenya (14.9%).  
 
Prior to formal liberalization of agricultural markets in the early 1990s the Sugar 
Development Corporation (SUDECO) monopolized the sugar market. Liberalization has 
accorded freedom to private firms and foreign trade to enter the sugar industry. Statistics 
show that a large proportion of the sugar output has been purchased and merchandised by 
local as well as foreign entrepreneurs. However, in spite of the fact that the industry has 
been liberalized not all aspects of the supply chain are completely free of government 
interventions. The newest Sugar Industry Act, 2001 (URT, 2002), among other things, 
still empowers the Sugar Board of Tanzania to register all sugarcane outgrowers in the 
country and to issue permits for sugar imports and exports.  
 
Sugar in Tanzania is mainly produced during the dry season (June-November). The 
produced sugar is normally stored and sold at the factories. Traders (both local traders 
and licensed exporters) buy sugar from the factory and ship it to local demand points or 
export markets via outlets such as major ports and border regions. Since domestic 
production cannot satisfy local demand, sometimes it is hard for traders to get sufficient 
sugar at the factories, especially when the factories are contracted to produce sugar for 
export or sugarcane production is low. When sugar stocks at the factories are depleted, 
“scarcity signals” are sent to the market and sugar vendors and agents might overreact to 
the shock by creating artificial price hikes. 
 
Analysts argue that sugar scarcity has been a major problem that limits market efficiency 
in the industry. Tarimo and Takamura (1998) reveal some arbitrage activities linked with 
low production such as illegal export of sugar or sugar hoarding by vendors to create 
artificial shortages. Furthermore, they argue that sugar scarcity empowers local vendors 
to determine prices in remote areas, which are often higher than prices in towns. These 
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prices.  
 
This review provides background information for assessing linkages between ex-factory 
prices and FOB sugar price in Tanzania and the linkage between FOB sugar prices in 
Tanzania and the selected world market reference price. Because Tanzania is a net sugar 
importer, the domestic market price should be more influenced by the import parity (CIF) 
price than the export parity (FOB) price. However, CIF unit values for Tanzanian sugar 
imports were not available. In the following analysis, the influence of the world market 
reference price on both the FOB price and the ex-factory price is investigated. 
 
Ex-factory price and FOB prices for refined sugar were obtained from the Sugar Board of 
Tanzania. The world market reference price for refined sugar was based on the Free 
Market, Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) contract no. 11, nearest future 
position (http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/datar.csv). Both series are in 
monthly terms and were transformed into common units namely US$ per metric ton. 
Farm gate prices for sugar cane could not be obtained. The absence of producer prices 
prevented price transmission analysis from the factories to the producers. 
 
Ex-factory and world market sugar prices are displayed in Figure 2 whereas FOB and the 
world market reference prices are displayed in Figure 3. Before testing for price 
integration the author calculated the shares of ex-factory prices in FOB prices and found 
that most of the shares were greater than one implying that, for the data period, ex-factory 
sugar prices were higher than FOB sugar prices (Figure 4). Two propositions could 
explain why the ex-factory prices are higher than FOB prices. First, sugar scarcity might 
cause spot prices at the factories to be higher than the expected or “quoted” FOB prices. 
Second, the transaction time needed to import or export the sugar might be long thereby 
inducing delays in price response.
2  Therefore, it is likely that local shocks might have 
more impact on domestic sugar prices than external shocks. The sugar price linkages 
were investigated further following the analytical frame in Appendix 1. 
 
First, the dynamic properties of the sugar prices were investigated using the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for the presence of a unit root (Tables 2 and 3). Unit root tests 
applied to prices in levels failed to reject the null hypothesis of non stationarity. 
However, when applied to first differences the tests rejected the null, indicating that the 
differenced series were stationary. Following the proposed analytical framework the 
series were tested for the order of integration using the Johansen approach. Bivariate co-
integration test results provided in Tables 4 and 5 rejected both the null of no co-
integration and the null of one co-integrating vector, which suggests that the order of 
integration was not the same. This suggests a lack of integration between these markets.  
 
Therefore, a Granger causality test was conducted following the specification in equation 
(3). Test results for Granger causality are summarized in Tables 6 through 9. Test results 
indicate that the world market sugar price Granger-caused the ex-factory sugar price but 
not vice versa. The test also indicates that the world market reference price for sugar 
                                                 
2 While the author believes that the former is more likely, he could not verify independently the later. 
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changes or shocks to the international sugar price do pass through to the domestic and 
export markets, but that they are not sufficiently strong to drive the ex-factory price of 
refined sugar. Granger-causality from the international to the ex-factory sugar price 
indicates that the sugar mills take some account of the international sugar price when 
setting the ex-factory price.  
 
3.2  The Cotton Industry 
 
In Tanzania,  cotton is the second largest export crop after coffee and it contributes 
significantly to export earnings. Ninety percent of cotton is produced in Mwanza, 
Shinyanga, Mara, Tabora, Kigoma, and Singida regions, which are commonly known as 
as the Western Growing Area (WGA). The rest is produced in Morogoro, Coast region, 
Arusha, Mbeya, Tanga, Kilimanjaro, and Iringa. 
 
Prior to formal liberalization, cooperative unions and the Tanzanian Cotton Board 
oversaw production, marketing and export of cotton. Market reforms that began in 1990 
changed the role of the Cotton Board from buying cotton to proving fee-based services to 
cooperative unions. The relaxation of price controls in 1992 allowed a system that 
required the announcement of indicative cotton prices instead of a compulsory price to 
emerge. The process of reforming the sector became effective in 1994 when the 
monopoly power held by the marketing board and unions was eliminated and private 
firms were allowed to participate in cotton marketing and ginning. The increased 
participation of the private sector became notable in 1996/97 when they handled almost 
half of the cotton. The private sector was able to rapidly increase its market share because 
these firms paid higher prices than the unions and marketing board and paid promptly. In 
general, there is a consensus that market reforms have improved the ginning capacity and 
marketing efficiency, and have increased the producer’s share of export prices. However, 
during the same period, input prices increased considerably and cotton quality 
deteriorated (Baffes, 2002; Kähkönen and Leathers, 1999).
3  Kähkönen and Leathers 
compared producer prices and export prices and found that the producer price as a 
percentage of export prices ranged between 29-111% (Figure 6). 
 
Following the liberalization of cotton marketing in Tanzania four main marketing 
channels emerged at the farm level: 1) producers selling cotton directly to cooperative 
unions; 2) producers selling their cotton at farm-gate to private traders or at a nearby 
buying station to a private trader who assembles cotton from several farmers and then 
transports it to a private ginnery; 3) producers selling cotton directly to private ginneries; 
and 4) producers selling cotton to the Tanzania Cotton Lint and Seed Board (TCLSB). 
Most of the private ginneries are located in the western cotton growing areas; as a result 
most private traders operate in the WGA. Producers in other areas continue to rely on 
cooperative unions. Kähkönen and Leathers indicate that in the 1996/97 season 69% of 
                                                 
3 Quality deterioration is attributable to increased cotton disease transmission and the pooling of cotton from growers producing 
different cotton varieties. After market reform traders were allowed to buy and distribute seeds from various sources, which 
accelerated inter-regional disease transmission (Gibbon, 1999). 
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the rest to private traders.  
 
Kähkönen and Leathers also identified that contract farming was fairly common in 
Tanzania. The emergence of contract farming was attributable to deliberate efforts by 
cooperative unions and private ginneries, which contracted farmers to produce cotton and 
promoted out grower schemes, respectively. In these contracts buyers provided inputs, 
either seed or both seeds and fertilizers. On their part, farmers agreed on the acreage 
requirement and to sell whatever quantity was harvested on contracted farms. Some of 
these contracts were formal, in the sense that producers signed contracts specifying the 
minimum quantity of cotton to be sold, as well as minimum prices, though the price 
could be adjusted in case farm-gate prices turned out to be higher than expected. 
 
After ginning cotton lint is either sold domestically or exported. According to TCLSB 
statistics cotton lint exported between 1981/82 and 1995/97 production years ranged 
between 50% to almost 100%. Therefore, Tanzania is a net exporter of cotton (Figure 6). 
Detailed analysis of total cotton exports from 1998 to 2004 reveals that Tanzania 
exported cotton to many countries including Bulgaria (15.72%), United Arab Emirates 
(10.42%), Burundi (8.75%), Switzerland (6.72%), Belgium (6.18%), France (5.79%), 
Bangladesh (5.69%), United Kingdom (5.44%), Indonesia (3.53%), India (3.41%), China 
(3.21%), Italy (2.61%), and Japan (1.75%). During the same period Tanzania imported 
small amounts of cotton mainly from United Arab Emirates (47.66%) and India 
(35.47%). 
 
While market reform has had many positive impacts on cotton marketing and producer 
prices there have been mixed feelings about cotton supply response after the reforms. 
Baffes (2002) cites a World Bank study which found a unit short-run supply response 
elasticity for cotton, arguably reflecting the farmer’s flexibility to switch backward and 
forward between cotton and other food crops. The reforms also meant a gradual decrease 
and eventual elimination of subsidy to the textile industry. The removal of subsidy to the 
industry coupled with increased global competition forced some firms out of the business 
thereby creating domestic shocks that might have discouraged cotton production. Dixon 
et al. (2004) observed that decline in prices of traditional export commodities has caused 
smallholders to reduce areas under crop cultivation and to shift to new cash crops or other 
food crops.  
 
On the other hand McKay, Morrissey, and Vaillant (1997) maintain that the potential for 
agricultural sector response to liberalization of agricultural prices and marketing might be 
quite significant, though not for the production of traditional export crops such as coffee, 
tea, and cotton. Baffes and Ajward (1998) examined the degree to which price linkages in 
cotton markets in different countries have improved over time; two interesting 
conclusions emerged from their analysis. Price linkages have improved over time, but the 
improvement is mainly a result of short-run price transmission and to a very limited 
extent a result of long-term co-movement.
4  Price linkages between Western African 
                                                 
4 The short-run transmission is mainly attributable to improvement in technology that has occurred as well 
as liberalization of cotton markets or alteration of the role played by governments in the cotton market. 
  10countries and Central Asia were higher than linkages between any other pair consisting of 
the U.S and Central Asia and Greece. The relatively high price linkages between Western 
Africa and Central Asia were attributable to the relatively large volume of cotton trade.
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In spite of the fact that cotton procurement competition in Tanzania has improved after 
market reforms, rules about permits and licences required to enter into the business 
hinder competition. Kähkönen and Leathers reported that, in addition to business 
registration, buyers of cotton also required separate licences for seed cotton buying and 
cotton ginning. Furthermore, they indicated that ginneries were assigned specific areas to 
buy cotton, and cotton movement from one zone to another was restricted. Consequently, 
the ginneries were granted monopoly power over cotton procurement in their zones 
thereby limiting competition and reducing efficiency in ginning. 
 
This information on cotton production and marketing in Tanzania provides the basis for 
interpreting and discussing statistical tests of price transmission, which are presented 
next. The analysis of price transmission is between the world market reference price for 
cotton and FOB cotton price in Tanzania. Since producer prices could not be obtained, 
statistical inferences regarding transmission of FOB price to farm-gate are not provided. 
The world market reference price used was CIF Liverpool-cotton price, also available at 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/datar.csv). FOB cotton prices were 
calculated as the unit value of cotton exports based on trade statistics from the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority. 
 
The approach used to test for sugar price transmission was also adopted to investigate the 
relation between the cotton price series. A summary of unit root test for cotton prices is 
presented in Table 10. Unit root tests applied to prices in levels for both the world market 
cotton reference price and FOB cotton price in Tanzania failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of non stationarity. Similar tests applied to differenced prices rejected the null 
hypothesis for a single mean equation. Co-integration tests results presented in Table 11 
rejected both the null of no co-integration and the null of one co-integrating vector. 
Therefore, the series were tested for GC. Granger-causality results presented in Tables 12 
and 13, show that the world market reference price Granger-caused the FOB cotton prices 
in Tanzania. This analysis suggests that though the series tended to drift apart from each, 
some signals from the world market were transmitted to local markets. The outcome is 
consistent with Baffes and Ajward (1998) and prior expectation because cotton produced 
in Tanzania is widely traded in the world market. 
 
3.3   The Wheat Industry 
 
Wheat in Tanzania is mainly produced in the northern highlands (Arusha and Kilimanjaro 
regions) and in the southern highlands (Iringa, Mbeya, and Rukwa regions). While wheat 
production in the southern highlands is predominantly small scale, production in the 
northern highlands is mainly in large scale farms. Large-scale mechanized, small- to 
                                                 
5 Cotton produced in West Africa was exported almost entirely to Central Asia, hence making both markets 
subject to the same demand shocks. Conversely, countries that have no strong trade linkages are subjected 
to both domestic and world market shocks, which reduce the degree of price linkages. 
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production in Tanzania. According to the Market Development Bureau (1989), wheat 
consumption in Tanzania is higher in urban areas (83%) than in rural areas (17%). Wheat 
demand is essentially in the form of wheat flour, which is both an intermediate product 
and final product (Mlay at el., 1989).
6  Despite the fact that wheat accounts for only 1.3% 
of the per capita calorie intake, its economic importance cannot be ignored for two 
reasons. First, most wheat consumed in Tanzania is imported implying that price shocks 
in wheat exporting countries might have significant impacts on foreign reserves. Second, 
effective wheat demand is in urban areas where population growth is high (estimated 
rates of growth are 3.89% in urban and 0.69% in rural areas, UN Population Division, 
2001) and wheat demand is bound to increase as the population grows (Mlay at el., 
1989). 
 
Wheat marketing in Tanzania has gone through major transformation over time. Prior to 
agricultural market reforms, the state controlled agricultural markets. The state controlled 
markets curtailed the role of private traders through restrictions on quantity handled and 
procurement rights at the farm-level. The aim of these policies was to ensure self-
sufficiency in food (World Bank, 1994). Thus, wheat along with other major food crops 
such as maize, rice, cassava, millet, sorghum, and beans were bought by state owned 
institutions. To enforce this policy, road-blocks were established along major outlets to 
minimize inter-regional trading.
7  Parallel to granting the purchase right to the state 
institutions was the establishment of minimum prices for various crops at different stages 
of the marketing chain (Suzuki and Bernard, 1987).  
 
The adopted pricing policy coupled with the uncompetitive procurement created three 
economic distortions worth mentioning. First, the marketing institutions procured crops at 
the “set prices” regardless of transportation costs. Therefore, to maintain the system, 
when operating costs were unbearable the government was compelled to subsidize 
marketing activities. Second, uncompetitive procurement meant that the producers’ price 
was by and large a residual after all the intermediary handling charges were deducted 
(Ibid.). Third, when the minimum price for a particular crop was set above the 
“competitive market price”, it encouraged production in regions far from main 
consumption centres thereby encouraging transfer of resources to production of that crop 
and raising production costs for other crops (Putterman, 1995; World Bank, 1999). 
Consequently the marketing institutions accumulated deficits and the distortions were 
augmented and became unmanageable. 
 
In an attempt to restore macroeconomic balance and efficiency to the economy, the 
government adopted reform programs prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. The reform process was gradual, and a comprehensive reform was 
achieved by 1991, when all restrictions on traders were lifted. The lifting of the 
restrictions on traders brought about active participation of the private traders in grain 
procurement (Coulter and Golob, 1992; Santorum and Tibaijuka, 1992). 
                                                 
6 Hotels, restaurants and other food industries use wheat flour to produce other final products. On the other 
hand individuals and some institutions buy wheat flour for direct consumption. 
7 Available evidence suggests that illegal trading thrived through the use of informal routes. 
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In summary, wheat markets and marketing channels have changed significantly after 
market liberalization. Prior to market reforms, consumers mainly bought wheat from 
official channels, which were the National Milling Cooperative (NMC), Regional 
Trading Centres (RTC) and National Distributors Limited (NDL). A smaller portion of 
wheat was supplied by private channels through private traders and open markets, as well 
as stocks retained by smallholder producers (Mlay et al.). After market reforms the 
private market supplied most the wheat through the following channels: inter-regional 
traders buying wheat from producers and shipping it to major markets in urban areas; 
small-scale millers buying wheat for milling and selling flour to buyers in major markets, 
agents, or specific firms; commercial millers buying wheat locally or importing it from 
abroad and selling wheat flour via agents; private traders buying wheat from producers 
and selling it to millers and individual producers selling wheat in specific target markets. 
In-depth analysis of the wheat marketing is provided below. 
 
Mlay et al. analysis of private marketing margins indicates that retail to farm gate spreads 
were large, reflecting high costs of transportation and the risk of holding grain while in 
transit. However, the analysis also indicates that price shocks were mainly absorbed by 
middlemen rather than consumers. Thus, in a short-term perspective, middlemen acted as 
shock absorbers, lowering their margin when farm-gate prices were rising and raising 
their margin when prices were falling. Mlay et al. also calculated farm level prices as a 
percentage of final consumer prices and found that 53.5% of the consumer price went to 
producers and the rest to the marketing sector. Similar analysis for official markets 
indicates that producers received only 40% of the average retail price, possibly reflecting 
inefficiency blended in the official marketing system, which has been discussed above.
8
 
Deldago, Minot, and Tiongco (2004) also estimated the evolution of spreads between 
prices in different parts of the country and Dar-es-salaam and found that spreads were 
higher for wheat than rice and maize. Nevertheless, they also found that in Dar-es-
salaam, which was a wheat supplying market, the spreads were significantly lower for 
wheat, rice, and to lesser extent maize. This analysis reveals two realities of the wheat 
market in Tanzania. First, wheat is imported all year round-even when domestic 
production is high; since Dar-es-salaam is the biggest import port and a major supplier of 
imported wheat in the country, it is likely for wheat price spreads between Dar-es-salaam 
and other regions to be high.
9  Second, wheat is one of the tradable crops in Tanzania and 
its price should be influenced by changes in the world market and exchange rate. 
 
The foregoing discussion has provided a detailed review of the wheat industry in 
Tanzania. In the reminder of this section international wheat marketing and market 
linkages are discussed. Analysis of wheat imports and exports using data from the TRA 
shows that Tanzania relies heavily on wheat imports (Figure 7). The TRA database shows 
that during 1998-2005 Tanzania imported wheat mainly from Australia (55.15%) and 
                                                 
8 This discussion could have been extended to include the analysis of transportation cost. However, data 
were not available. 
9 Transaction costs involved in shipping wheat from importing regions to others might differ across regions 
because of differences in road infrastructure and travel distances. 
  13Pakistan (29.77%). During the same period Tanzania exported wheat to DRC (23.31%), 
Burundi (21.28%), Rwanda (19.90%), Kenya (10.47%), Uganda (10.18%), United Arab 
Emirates (4.82%) as well as to a number of other countries.  
 
In the above discussion it has been argued that Tanzania is a net importer of wheat and 
wheat prices might be influenced by changes in the world market and exchange rates. To 
test the validity of this argument we applied the analytical framework to the wheat price 
series presented in Figure 2. The world market reference price used was No. 1 Hard Red 
Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, which is available at 
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/datar.csv). Unit values of wheat imports 
were calculated from trade data of the Tanzanian Revenue Authority. First the series were 
tested for stationarity using the ADF test (Table 14). The test statistics rejected the null 
for both series in levels, but failed to reject the null under zero mean equation for the 
differenced price. The series were tested for cointegration and results rejected both null 
hypotheses of zero and one cointegrating vectors (Table 15). Therefore, GC tests were 
performed. Results for these tests are summarized in Tables 16 and 17. The GC test show 
that the world market reference price for wheat Granger-cause the CIF wheat price in 
Tanzania, and not vice-versa. These findings indicate that the two series drifted apart 
from each other but some price shocks from the world market were transmitted through 
to Tanzania. 
 
In addition to assessing linkages between the world and local wheat markets, linkages 
between local markets in Tanzania and its export markets for wheat products were also 
assessed. This additional analysis was motivated by the fact the TRA officials revealed 
that some wheat imported to Tanzania was re-exported in the form of wheat flour to other 
countries. Detailed analysis of wheat flour exports indicated that between 1998 and 2000, 
Tanzania exported wheat flour to DRC (49.79%), Rwanda (20.52%), Uganda (17.47%), 
Burundi (6.61%), Malawi (3.23%), and Comoros (1.59%). African countries, taken 
together, imported 99.91% all wheat flour exported of which 76.98% went to “politically 
unstable” countries of DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. These statistics might 
provide a basis for assessing multiple sources of price shocks in Tanzania; for example, 
one might ask the question; what are the impacts of macro-economic instability in DRC, 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe on price changes in Tanzania?  
 
The author attempted to answer the above question using price linkages between CIF 
wheat prices in Tanzania and corresponding FOB prices for wheat flour exported from 
Tanazania, which are displayed in Figure 9. The comparison of these series was based on 
the assumption that wheat processing costs were constant. Using the proposed analytical 
frame the series were tested for stationarity using the ADF test. The tests applied to prices 
in levels failed to reject the null hypothesis of non stationarity, but when applied to first 
difference the test rejected the null hypothesis (Table 18). The series were tested for the 
order of cointegration, the test rejected both the null hypotheses of zero and cointegrating 
vectors (Table 19). Extension of the analysis to GC tests indicated that FOB prices of 
exported wheat Granger-caused the CIF wheat prices in Tanzania (Table 19), which 
implies that import prices for wheat in Tanzania were jointly determined by some price 
  14shocks, which passed through from the world market as well as from countries in the 
neighbourhood. 
 
3.4     The Rice Industry 
 
In Tanzania, rice is the second most preferred staple after maize (URT, 1995). It is 
estimated that rice constitutes 16.6% of cereal consumption in Tanzania (Food Strategy 
Unit, 1989). According to World Bank (2000) rice is a tradable commodity, has high-
income elasticity of demand, and its local prices are influenced by international prices 
and the exchange rate. Gabagambi (1998) indicates that rice is highly preferred in urban 
areas, institutions such as hospitals and schools, and in restaurants. Two reasons might 
explain the observed preference in rice consumption. Most of the people in non-rice 
growing rural areas of Tanzania are poor and cannot afford to buy rice on a regular basis. 
The preference for rice in restaurants and institutions is mainly due to its convenience in 
terms of catering (Gabagambi).  
 
In general, paddy is mainly produced in small scale farms of 0.5-2.4 hectares and is rain-
fed. There are only a few large scale irrigated farms under the ownership of the National 
Agricultural Food Corporation (NAFCO). Kanyeka et al. cited by Isinika, Ashimogo, and 
Mlangwa (2005) indicate that 74% of the total paddy area in the country is rain-fed 
lowland rice, 20% is upland rice, and 6% is irrigated. 
 
Most rice produced in the country is marketed by the private sector. The general 
institutional architecture of grain markets and how the market structure has evolved over 
time has been provided in section 4.3. Despite the fact that market reforms might have 
common impacts to all grain markets, the actual marketing chains that emerged after 
reforms could be commodity-specific. Thus, rice marketing chains after the reforms are 
discussed next. 
 
A study by Gabagambi identified seven market participants in rice marketing, namely 
producers, local assemblers, millers, inter-regional traders, wholesalers, retailers and 
consumers. The marketing channels resulting from the interactions of these participants 
are shown in Figure 10. Since a large number of market participants are involved in the 
chain, it is unlikely that price signals can pass through from consumers to farm levels 
without being distorted, especially in segmented markets. However, the inference 
regarding the transmission of border price to farm gate is purely qualitative.
10
 
In the context of international trade, Tanzania is linked to the world market through rice 
imports and exports. Statistics indicate that the country is a net importer of rice (Figure 
13). Between 1998 and 2004, Tanzania imported rice mainly from Vietnam (39.20%), 
Thailand (12.91%), China (11.36%), Pakistan (7.06%) and India (5.64%). During the 
same period Tanzania exported rice to Rwanda (53.81%), Kenya (28.98%), Uganda 
(9.70%), Comoros (2.40%), DRC (1.69%), and Burundi (1.45%). In brief, during the data 
                                                 
10  The discussion is not backed up by statistical inferences because information on farm-gate prices, 
transaction costs, price spreads, and traders’ margin could not be obtained. 
 
  15period, 98.76% of rice exported from Tanzania was bough by African countries. During 
the same period joint imports by Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe were 56.95%. 
 
Since Tanzania is a net importer of rice (Figure 11), the author tested for price linkages 
between CIF prices for imported rice and a world market rice reference price. The price 
series are shown in Figure 12. The ADF tests applied to the series are presented in Table 
22. The tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of non stationary for both prices in levels 
and first differences. The rice price series were also tested for cointegration and results 
rejected both null hypotheses of zero and one cointegrating vectors (Table 23)  Finally 
the author tested for GC between the series (Tables 24 and 25). Results for GC tests 
indicated that the world market reference price for rice Granger-caused the CIF rice price 
in Tanzania.  
 
4.  Summary of Major Findings and Concluding Remarks 
 
This study has investigated whether there is a flexible pass-through of price shocks from 
the world market to specific commodity markets in Tanzania. Co-integration and Granger 
causality techniques were used to test for price linkages. For the analysed commodity 
prices (sugar, cotton, wheat, and rice), the co-integration results indicate that the 
CIF/FOB prices in Tanzania were not well integrated with commodity prices in the world 
market. However, Granger-causality tests revealed the existence of a unidirectional-
causal relationship, whereby commodity prices in the world market Granger-caused 
prices in Tanzania. The two methodologies taken together imply that commodity prices 
in the world market and local markets in Tanzania drifted apart from each other, but some 
shocks from the world market passed through to Tanzania though not vice-versa. In-
depth analysis of trade networks indicated that Tanzania responded simultaneously to 
price shocks from the world market and from neighbourhood markets. 
 
This imperfect price transmission may be the result of export procedures, quantitative 
restrictions, internal taxes, intensity of competition and contingency trade remedies which 
influence traders’ choice to export the commodities to nearby countries or other foreign 
countries. Furthermore, it is important to note that multiple membership of overlapping 
regional trade agreements such as the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and Eastern African Community (EAC) also creates shocks that affect responses 
to external changes in commodity prices. Therefore, the magnitude and direction of price 
transmission depend on the relative influence of price shocks in regional markets and the 
world reference markets on local markets in Tanzania. 
 
However, the poor price linkages between domestic commodity markets in Tanzania and 
the world market are more likely to be an outcome of the continuing large distortions in 
local markets such as bureaucratic licensing procedures, monopoly procurement, poor 
exchange of market information, and high transaction costs. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of this study have two major implications. First, the impact of 
ongoing trade reform in world markets might not have significant effects because there is 
only partial transmission of price shocks from the world market to Tanzania. Second, for 
  16the trade reform to have a greater impact there must be concerted efforts by policy 
makers to reduce the monopoly power held by marketing institutions/regulators which 
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Figure 12:    World Market Broken Rice Price and CIF Prices for Broken Rice in 
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  29Table 1  Sugar Imported to Tanzania: 1998-2004 
Country of Origin  Amount (Kg) Share
South Africa  855815  43.31 
India 350300  17.73 
Netherlands     279500  14.14 
Zambia 244000  12.35 
Thailand 105000  5.31 
Belgium 86000  4.35 
Germany 43000  2.18 
United Arab Emirates  7502  0.38 
Italy 1900  0.10 
China 1580  0.08 
Denmark 1205  0.06 
United Kingdom  417  0.02 
Total  855815 100.00 
Source: TRA database (2005). 
 
Table 2:   Augmented  Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Tau Statistics) for FOB 





  Levels First Differences
Series  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend 
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Note that figures in parenthesis represent (Pr ) Tau < . 
Source: Own Analysis  
 
 
Table 3:   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Tau Statistics) for Ex-factory 
Sugar Prices ( )  P
sugf
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  Levels First Differences
Series  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend 
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Source: Own Analysis  
 
Table  4:    Co-integration Rank for FOB Sugar Prices in Tanzania ( ) and 







Number of cointegrating vector     
: 0 H Rank equals to  : H a Rank equals to  Trace Critical  Values 
0 1  99.143  19.99 
1 2  39.96  9.13 
Source: Own Analysis  
  30Table  5:    Co-integration Rank for Ex-factory ( ) and World Market Sugar 







Number of Cointegrating vector     
: 0 H Rank equals to  : H a Rank equals to  Trace Critical  Values 
0 1  96.13  12.21 
1 2  36.13  4.14 
Source: Own Analysis  
 
































Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 6.25  (2,  128)  0.0025 
Asymptotic    χ
2 12.99 2  0.0015 
Source: Own Analysis  
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Test 












Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 0.2814  (2,131)    0.7551 
Asymptotic     χ
2 0.5848 2  0.7464 
Source: Own Analysis  
































Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 4.2599  (2,  128)  0.0161 
Asymptotic    χ
2 8.8526 2  0.0119 
Source: Own Analysis  


















1 4 ζ ψ
Test 












Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 0.7601  (2,131)    0.4696 
Asymptotic     χ
2 1.5796 2  0.4539 
Source: Own Analysis  
  31Table  10:    Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Tau Statistics) for FOB 
Cotton Prices in Tanzania ( ) and World Market Reference Price 







Series  Levels First Differences
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Source: Own Analysis  
 
Table 11:   Co-integration  Rank  for FOB Cotton Price in Tanzania ( ) and 







Number of Cointegrating vector     
: 0 H Rank equals 
to 
: H a Rank equals to  Trace Critical  Values 
0 1  129  12.21 
1 2  37.21  4.14 
Source: Own Analysis  
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Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 7.2522  (2,  115)  0.0010 
Asymptotic    χ
2 15.1350 2  0.0005 
Source: Own Analysis  
 


















1 6 γ ϕ
Test 












Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 0.4309  (2,115)    0.6509 
Asymptotic     χ
2 0.8993 2  0.6378 
Source: Own Analysis  
  32Table 14:   Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Tau Statistics) for CIF wheat 








  Levels First Differences
Series  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend 
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Source: Own Analysis  
 
Table  15:   Co-integration Rank for CIF wheat Price in Tanzania ( ) and 







Number of Cointegrating vector     
: 0 H Rank equals to  : H a Rank equals to  Trace Critical  Values 
0 1  100.65  12.21 
1 2  27.15  4.14 
Source: Own Analysis  
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Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 4.9808  (2,79)  0.0091 
Asymptotic    χ
2 10.5922 2  0.0050 
Source: Own Analysis  
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Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 0.6608  (2,79)    0.5192 
Asymptotic     χ
2 1.4053 2  0.4952 
Source: Own Analysis  
 
  33Table 18:   Augmented  Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Tau Statistics) for CIF 





  Levels First Differences
Series  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend 
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Source: Own Analysis  
 
Table 19:   Cointegration Test for CIF Wheat Prices ( ) and FOB Prices of 







Number of Cointegrating vector     
: 0 H Rank equals to  : H a Rank equals to  Trace Critical  Values 
0 1  100.65  12.21 
1 2  27.15  4.14 
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Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 3.1993  (2,55)  0.0479 
Asymptotic    χ
2 6.9409 2  0.0311 
Source: Own Analysis  
 


















1 10 ζ φ
Test 












Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 1.1689  (2,55)    0.3177 
Asymptotic     χ
2 2.5359 2  0.2814 






  34Table 22:   Augmented  Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests (Tau Statistics) for CIF 
Rice Price in Tanzania ( ) and World Market Reference Price for 







  Levels First Differences
Series  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend  Zero Mean  Single Mean  Trend 
P
ricd
t   ln


























Source: Own Analysis  
 
Table 23:   Co-integration  Rank  for CIF Rice Price in Tanzania ( ) and 







Number of Cointegrating vector     
: 0 H Rank equals to  : H a Rank equals 
to 
Trace Critical  Values 
0 1  105.18  12.21 
1 2  34.00  4.14 
Source: Own Analysis  
 
































Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 4.9715  (2,  79)  0.0092 
Asymptotic    χ
2 10.5724 2  0.0050 
Source: Own Analysis  
 


















1 14 ζ ψ
Test 












Value  d. f  Significance  
F-Statistic 2.2217  (2,79)    0.1151 
Asymptotic     χ
2 4.7247 2  0.09441 
Source: Own Analysis  
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